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 Corruption, commonly defined in the literature as the abuse of public power for private 
benefit, is a pervasive and universal phenomenon, and affects almost every culture to differing 
degrees. As witnessed throughout history, corruption can affect democratic and non-democratic 
countries, rich and poor countries, and corporations alike.  In very recent times, corruption, or the 
allegation of corruption, has been instrumental in the reorganization of the political system in 
Italy, the change of governments in Indonesia, Japan, Peru and the Philippines, the collapse of 
governmental authority in Zaire, and the bankruptcies of Arthur Andersen, Enron, and MCI, 
among others.  Corruption poses a threat to investment for a number of reasons: it reduces public 
and private sector efficiency when it enables people to assume positions of power through 
patronage rather than ability; distorts the financial economic and environment; and, at the limit, 
introduces instability and anarchy into the political process. 
 Previous examinations of the question of the influence of corruption on investment that 
use national income and product accounts (NIPA) data may, in fact, be biased.  NIPA reports do 
not normally break down gross domestic investment into its private and public sector 
components, especially in the case of developing and transitional countries.  When NIPA reports 
contain disaggregated investment data, private investment data often includes investment by 
state-owned enterprises (SOE) (Pfeffermann, Kisunko, and Sumlinski, 1997; Everhart and 
Sumlinski, 2001). Using the International Finance Corporation’s definitions of public and private 
investment requires SOE investment be correctly identified as public investment, not private 
investment, unlike the current definitions used by most sovereigns for national income 
accounting. 
 In this paper we employ a new database using the IFC’s definitions of public and private 
investment to theoretically and empirically investigate the influence of corruption on the 
accumulation of human, private, and public capital and the rate of economic growth.  We 
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explicitly allow for corruption to influence economic growth directly and indirectly through 
investment and governance channels.  As we note below, many of the previous examinations of 
the impact of corruption either explore corruption’s direct impact on economic growth or a 
specific area of interest (investment, human capital formation, rule of law, among others) but fail 
to examine the channels through which corruption may influence economic growth.  In this 
paper, we extend the literature by explicitly modeling and empirically examine the direct and 
indirect influence of corruption on economic growth.  While we find that the impact of 
corruption on the level of investment appears to be more ambiguous than previously suggested in 
the literature; corruption, not surprisingly, appears to negatively influence the accumulation of 
human capital and the pace of economic growth.   
 The paper is structured as follows.  We first review the literature on corruption.  We then 
develop a theoretical model of corruption in the third section that explicitly incorporates 
corruption’s direct and indirect influences on economic growth.  In the fourth section, we 
empirically investigate the hypothesized impacts of corruption and attempt to quantify the 
aggregate influence of corruption on investment and economic growth.  In the last section, we 
conclude with a review of policy implications, highlight the shortcomings and strengths of our 
work, and suggest areas for further research. 
Literature Review  
 Why do we care about the impact of corruption?  A predictable economic environment is 
important for private investors. When investors are assured that the returns on enterprise and 
investment accrue to the entrepreneur and investor, investment is more likely to ensue. An 
environment where corruption and bribery are prevalent creates a situation where investment 
returns are difficult to predict. An unstable economic environment has two primary effects on 
private investment decisions: expected returns are lowered due to increased costs, and two, the 
dispersion of outcomes is larger, though manageable if the resources invested actually produce 
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the desired result. (Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillian, and Woodruff, 2000).  As noted initially in 
the seminal work of Mauro (1995, 1998), both effects serve to limit investment, which is critical 
to long-run, sustainable economic development.  In this section we briefly review the arguments 
related to the impact of corruption on governance, investment, and growth. 
Investigating the impact of corruption is not a new concept, yet quantifying the impact 
remains elusive (Tanzi 2002; Jain 2001; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Theobald, 1990).  A recent 
transitional country survey suggests that almost 40 percent of new enterprise expenses are 
consumed by informal payments (IMF, 2000).  Only 13 percent of central government education 
transfers for non-wage expenditures in Uganda reached local governments during 1991-1995, the 
remainder were either appropriated for non-education purposes or corrupt activities (Reinikka 
and Svensson, 2004).  While we must express a note of caution with respect to surveys that ask 
potential participants and victims of corrupt practices to report on the magnitude and frequency 
of such practices (Reinikka and Svensson, 2003; Svensson 2003); there appears to be sufficient 
consensus in the literature that less corruption might translate into more resources available for 
private investment. Moreover, strengthened public revenues as a result of less “leakage” due to 
corruption could translate into more public services or reduced taxes. 
Although one might expect a broad consensus to exist concluding that corruption is bad, 
some authors have argued that under the proper circumstances, corruption may facilitate faster 
growth by serving as an “efficient grease” (Kaufmann and Wei 2000; Braguinsky 1996).  
Corruption can also be used to reverse errors in judgment by the government (Leff, 1989).  
Bribery may allow “better” firms to bypass red tape and thus reward market performance (Lui, 
1985).  Excessive regulation could be muted by bribery and, in some circumstances; corruption 
may be efficiency enhancing (Bardhan, 1997).  Corruption incorporates otherwise alienated 
groups, integrates them, and provides them with an alternative to violence (Huntington, 1968).  
Finally, corruption among politicians may serve as the glue holding a country together, 
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suggesting that corruption may lower the probability of conflict and indirectly enhance economic 
growth (Huntington, 2000; Graziano, 1980). 
Despite these interesting perspectives on corruption, the economics literature generally 
disapproves of such practices.  Firms that spend more management time with bureaucrats pay 
more in bribes and also pay a higher cost of capital (Kaufmann and Wei, 2000).  Corruption may 
strain the linkages between taxes and public sector goods and services and thus promote tax 
evasion and the growth of the unofficial economy (Johnson, Kaufman, and Shleifer, 1997; 
Johnson, Kaufman, and Zoido-Lobaton, 1998; Loayza, 1996).  Higher levels of corruption and 
bureaucratic inefficiency appear to positively influence the unofficial economy’s share of GDP 
(Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann, 2003; Frye and Zhuravskaya, 2000; Johnson, Kaufmann, 
McMillian, and Woodruff, 2000; Schneider, 2000; Alexeev and Pyle, 2003). 
Corruption has been found to limit economic development by inhibiting growth in per 
capita income, child mortality, and literacy (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2003; Mo, 2001).  
Corruption also appears to adversely affect public and private investment, although questions 
remain on the data and methodology employed in these studies (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002; Del 
Monte and Papagni, 2001; Tanzi and Hamid, 2000; Wei, 2000; Mauro 1995, 1998).  Corruption 
may also affect economic policy by distorting the judgment of policymakers (Bai and Wei, 2000, 
2001).  Corruption cannot be assumed to be exogenous from the distortions it creates in the 
allocation of resources; distortions that create incentives for increased corruption.  Although 
specific methodologies raise doubts about issues of causation, the consensus in the literature 
appears to suggest that corruption is negatively related to several crucial economic variables. 
If one accepts the current consensus in the literature that corruption negatively influences 
private and public sector outcomes, improving governance may be one way of combating 
corruption.  Corruption thrives where states are too weak to control their own bureaucrats, to 
protect property and contract rights, and to provide the institutions that underpin an effective rule 
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of law (Mauro, 2004; Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Eigen, 2002; Rivera-Batiz, 2002; Broadman 
and Recanatini, 2002).  Improving political accountability appears, as this line of reasoning goes, 
to improve governance and reduce corruption.  Accountability allows for the punishment of 
politicians who adopt bad policies and the limitation of bureaucratic monopoly power, thereby 
more closely aligning politicians’ and bureaucrats preferences with those of the populace 
(Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2002; Laffont and Meleu, 2001; Rose-
Ackerman, 1999, 1998).  Democratic elections, parliamentary systems, political stability, fiscal 
decentralization, and freedom of the process all appear to be associated with lower levels of 
corruption (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2003; Tanzi, 2000; Andvig, 1999).  Curiously, while 
the topics of corruption, investment, governance, and growth have garnered a significant amount 
of attention in the recent literature, there is a paucity of theoretical models of corruption that 
explicitly examine the outcomes of corruption.  In many cases, models of corruption tend to 
focus on the causes and determinants of corruption rather than the outcomes of corruption (Ali 
and Isse, 2003; Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi, 2003; Gyimah-Brempong, 2002; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1993).   
More recently, Pellegrini and Gerlaugh (2004), Papyrakis and Gerlaugh (2004), Mo 
(2000, 2001) empirically analyze the influence of corruption through various direct and indirect 
channels on economic growth.  In general, these studies find that corruption retards economic 
growth, primarily through its detrimental impact on investment and international trade.  
Pellegrini and Gerlaugh, more importantly from the perspective of our study, note that there is 
not a statistically significant direct relationship between corruption and economic growth once 
other relevant factors are controlled for.  While among the first studies attempting to examine the 
indirect channels through which corruption impacts economic growth, we note that these studies 
rely on a cross sectional approach and upon investment data that classifies SOE investment as 
private investment.  Islam (2004) further argues that the unobserved fixed country effects and 
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potential multicollinearity between explanatory variables are likely to bias the estimation of the 
impact of corruption on per capita GDP.  With these findings in mind, we turn to the derivation 
of the theoretical model. 
A Simple Model of Corruption, Investment, and Growth 
 While the potential influence of corruption on output through investment is not one of the 
conventional arguments for anti-corruption efforts, ignoring this potential effect, we believe, may 
inject a priori bias into our analysis. More importantly, by examining the impact of corruption 
within a neoclassical model of output, we can explore how corruption and governance influence 
investment and the tradeoffs between public and private investment. 
 Following Islam (1995), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), and Romer (1986), we 
assume a Cobb-Douglas production function for the economy such that production at time t is 
given by 
θϕβα
tttttt LHGKVY =  (1)
where α, β, ϕ, θ > 0 and α + β + ϕ + θ ≥ 1.  Yt is output, Vt the level of technology and other 
institutional factors, Kt, Gt , Ht are the stocks of private, public and human capital, and Lt is labor 
at time t, respectively.1  We define Vt as the product of the level of technology and other 
institutional factors at time t or 
tttt ZCAV =  (2)
where Vt is the exogenous level of technology, Ct the level of corruption, and Zt is a row vector 
of exogenous variables that may influence output.2  Note that Ct is synonymous with the direct 
effect of corruption on output.  If corruption indirectly influences output through its impact on 
                                                 
1 A complete derivation of the theoretical model is available upon request. 
2 At this time, for theoretical simplicity, we assume that corruption and the set of exogenous variables are 
uncorrelated. 
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investment, certius paribus, then it will indirectly influence economic output through either Kt, 
Ht, or Gt.  
 We further assume that output is subject to decreasing returns to scale with respect to 
physical and human capital.  This implies that the economy, over the long-run, will tend to 
constant private capital-labor, human capital-labor, and public capital-labor ratios.3  Once steady 
state output is achieved, additional increases in per capita output can only be achieved through 
increases in capital productivity or decreases in the level of corruption (assuming that the overall 
effect of corruption on economic growth is negative).4   It is this perspective that interests us in 
this paper: corruption may affect output through two channels, a potential direct effect on output, 
and a series of potential indirect effects through the physical inputs in the production function. 
To determine the influence of corruption on economic growth, we must first determine 
the steady state levels of the physical inputs in the production function.  We assume that the 
same production function applies to all forms of reproducible capital and consumption so that 
one unit of capital can be freely transformed into one unit of consumption and vice versa. Labor 
is assumed to grow exogenously at rate n, technology at rate w, capital depreciates at rate δ, and 
corruption changes at rate c.  Assuming decreasing marginal returns to all forms of reproducible 
capital; that no combination of capital inputs exhibits constant marginal returns; expanding Vt 
                                                 
3 The growth model specified in Equation 1 can be either a Solow-augmented neoclassical growth model with 
constant returns to scale for all production factors (α + β + ϕ + θ  = 1), or an endogenous growth model with 
increasing returns to scale for all production factors (α + β + ϕ + θ  ≥ 1).  Also, if any combination of the capital 
inputs exhibits constant returns to scale (α + β =1, β + ϕ =1, α + ϕ =1) then Equation (1) would similarly be 
characterized as an endogenous growth model.  Senhadji (1999) noted that a large part of the empirical growth 
literature supports the assumption of decreasing returns to capital. 
4 While changes in resource endowments (the discovery of new resources or a cure for AIDS) may affect short-term 
capital-labor ratios, these changes would not necessarily affect the steady state capital-labor ratio unless these 
changes influenced capital productivity. Gerson (1998) argues that since the convergence to the new steady state 
may take years to occur, fiscal policy can still lead to higher output growth rates for a significant period of time, 
even though the neoclassical model might imply that these policies would affect only the level of output and not its 
long-run growth rate. 
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and taking the natural logarithm yields from (1) and (2) the steady state level of output per 

























where ik , ig, and ih are the fractions of output invested in private, public, and human capital, 
respectively.  Transforming (3) into differences in per capita output, noting that  λ = (n + g + δ + 
c)(1 - α - β - ϕ), and defining y0 as the initial level of per capita output, the evolution of per 






































We illustrate in (4) the direct and indirect influence of corruption on the evolution of per 
capita output over time.  Corruption may directly influence per capita output, that is, increased 
levels of corruption C retard per capita output growth.  Corruption may also indirectly influence 
per capita output growth by inhibiting the accumulation of public, private, and human capital.  
Efforts to lower corruption may have immediate direct and indirect positive influences on the 
evolution of per capita output over time. 
An advantage of our theoretical specification over the models used in previous papers is 
our explicit examination of the out-of-steady-state dynamics.  In addition, we also make explicit 
the difference between the bounded institutional factors in the production function and the 
physical inputs in the production function.  The bounded institutional factors directly influence 
economic growth while the physical inputs are weighted by the ratio of their output share to 
                                                 
5 The effective unit of labor is the technology augmented unit of labor; see Islam (1995).   
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labor's share of output.  Finally, we explicitly capture the unobservable initial conditions in the 
theoretical model.  Empirically, equation (4) suggests that corruption is an explanatory variable 
in the evolution of private, public, and human capital over time.  When investigating the 
evolution of per capita output, corruption may enter directly as an explanatory variable or 
indirectly as an interaction term with other variables of interest.   
Two problems may arise with our derivation of the steady state production function and 
the equation for the convergence to the steady state output level.  First, if countries have 
permanent differences in technology, then these differences would enter as part of the error term 
and be positively correlated with initial per capita output.  Permanent variations in technology 
could bias the estimated coefficient on initial per capita output toward zero.  Second, while 
countries may not have permanent variations in technology, they may have permanent variations 
in their institutional factors (colonial legacy, legal system, climate, geographical region) that 
would also enter as part of the error term.  We address these issues below. 
Data 
 Accepting the various limitations of measures of corruption discussed in the literature, we 
utilize the corruption index from Political Risk Service’s International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) which has been previously employed in the economics literature (Rajkumar and 
Swaroop, 2002; Tanzi and Davoodi, 2002; Knack, 2001; Knack and Keefer, 1995). The ICRG 
attempts to measure corruption by investigating whether high-ranking government officials are 
likely to demand special payments and if illegal payments are generally expected in lower levels 
of government and has been used in the economics literature.6  For convenience, we rescale the 
ICRG 0 (most corruption) to 6 (least corrupt) index to a 0 (absence of corruption) to 1 
(completely corruption).  Unlike other, perhaps more complete datasets that also attempt to 
measure corruption, the ICRG database has monthly ratings for over 100 countries from 1984 to 
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present.7  We follow a similar approach in employing the ICRG index of bureaucratic quality as 
our proxy for institutional quality and the strength of the public service.8 
 Turning the question of public and private investment, we define private investment as 
the difference between total gross domestic investment and consolidated public investment.9  
This approach is necessary, we argue, to remove the potential bias of SOE and other types of 
public investment that are normally reported as private investment in the national accounts data.  
Consolidated public investment data for each country were compiled primarily from World Bank 
Country Economic Memoranda, Public Investment Reviews, Public Expenditure Reviews, and 
other World Bank and IMF country reports.  Where World Bank data were not available, country 
data obtained from government officials and websites were used.  Sixty-three countries are 
represented in the investment data.10   
 When we merge the investment data with the corruption and governance measures, our 
sample falls to fifty countries.  We do, however, believe that this is still the largest panel of 
public and private investment data to date for developing and transitional economies.  Our final 
sample covers fifty countries for the period 1984-1999 with a total of 684 observations.11   We 
must note that our sample data is limited to developing and transitional countries due to the 
scope of the original work.   
                                                                                                                                                             
6 For additional information on the International Country Risk Guide, see http://www.icrgonline.com. 
7 We choose not to employ Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index due to the short length of the 
time series and the variability in the measurement methodologies over time.  We also choose not to employ the 
World Bank’s 2000 World Business Environment Survey (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wbes) as we 
wished to investigate the evolution of corruption, investment, and growth across time.  We do note, however, that 
the ICRG index correlates highly with the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for the 1996-
2002 periods. 
8 The precise ICRG definition of their measure is as follows: the institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy 
is another shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy when governments change.  Therefore, high 
points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes 
in policy or interruptions in government services.  In these low-risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat 
autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training.  
9 For a detailed discussion of the investment data employed in this research, see Everhart and Sumlinski (2001). 
10 See Appendix A for the countries included in the sample used for this study. 
11 See Appendix B for the variables included in the sample. 
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Econometric Model and Empirical Issues 
 We must first note that, unlike our study which employs panel data, the majority of the 
research on corruption has been done with cross-sectional data.  In addition, much of the work on 
investment in emerging markets has also relied on cross-sectional data. Those time-series 
analyses that do exist are largely country-specific.  As for our data sample, comparable data for 
developed countries are not available at this time.  Future research could focus on developing 
similar measures for developed countries. 
 Our empirical strategy is straightforward.  We first examine whether serial correlation is 
present using a Durbin-Waston test for OLS regressions and a Bhargava, Franzini, and 
Narendranathan (BFN) (1982) test based upon the residuals of the Within estimator for the panel 
data regressions.  If serial correlation is present, we first difference the data and test whether 
serial correlation is present in residuals from the estimations employing first differenced data.  
We then test for hetoerskedasticity using Breusch-Pagan (1980) for the OLS estimations as 
suggested by Koenker and Bassett (1982).  For panel data estimators, we employ the Koenker 
and Bassett (1982) test using the Within or GLS residuals, as appropriate.  To correct for 
heteroscedasticity, if present, we use the White (1980) heteroskedastic consistent covariance 
estimator.  Baltagi (1995) points out that even if we have homoskedastic errors, there is no 
penalty associated with the incorrect use of the White heteroskedastic consistent covariance 
estimator for the OLS or Within models. Thus, even if there are other models we have 
incorrectly diagnosed as being heteroskedastic when they are not, the parameter estimates are not 
adversely affected.   
 For questions of endogeneity, we follow Hausman (1978), Hausman and Taylor (1981), 
and Baltagi (1995).  To calculate a Hausman test statistics, we must have a sufficient number of 
independent regressors.  One difficulty is the number of available instruments that are 
independent. Anderson and Hsiao (1981) present a ready solution when using panel data in 
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differences. In the case of first-differenced panel data, an appropriate instrument is the second-
period lagged level of the regressor in question. Anderson and Hsiao assert that the choice of 
instruments should be correlated with the endogenous variable but not with the contemporaneous 
value of the dependent variable and the second-period lagged level of the regressor in question 
typically meets these requirements.  It is this lack of available instruments that precludes us from 
estimating the following equations as a system.  
 What is the impact of corruption on private investment?  To investigate the influence of 
corruption, we employ the pooled OLS estimator, one-way country-specific error components 
estimator, the one-way time-effects errors component estimator and the two-way error 
components estimator.12  We hypothesize that private investment is a function of public 







it ZQIICCI νλµβββββ +++++++= 54321 )(  (5)
where IPit is private investment, Cit is corruption, IGit is public investment, Qit is the governance, 
Cit * IGit is the interaction between corruption and public investment, and Z represents an array of 
conditioning variables.  The error term is composed of µI, the unobservable country specific 
effect, λt, the unobservable time specific effect, and the white-noise stochastic disturbance term, 
νit. The subscripts i and t refer to country i during year t, respectively.  We note the presence of 
serial correlation in the error terms when the base estimation equation is estimated in levels and 
thus specify the equation in first differences (Table 1).13 
 Testing for the presence of endogeneity of public investment in (5)14, we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis of exogeneity for private investment with respect to the public investment.15  We 
                                                 
12 The full set of estimation results is available upon request. 
13 We reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at the 1% significance level using a Durbin-Watson test for 
serial correlation.  Re-specifying the model in first differences, we fail to reject the null hypothesis.   
14 We fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity with a Hausman test statistic of 0.08 with 565 degrees of 
freedom . 
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also note the presence of heteroskedasticity (Table 2).  We then examine whether the random 
effects GLS estimator or fixed effects Within estimator is more appropriate for the estimation of 
(5).  While we would prefer to use the random effects estimator to avoid the loss of degrees of 
freedom associated with the use of the Within estimator, we reject the null hypothesis that the 
regressors and effects are uncorrelated.  As this result suggests that the random effects estimator 
is inconsistent, we use the fixed effects estimator for the estimation of the relationship between 
private investment, public investment, and corruption.  Finally, we examine whether the fixed 
effects are jointly significant, that is, whether the time and country specific effects are 
significant.  Curiously, the time and country specific effects are insignificant, regardless of the 
set of conditioning variables, suggesting the pooled OLS estimator is the most efficient 
estimator. 
 From this paper’s perspective, the most important result is that the corruption interaction 
term is relatively large and statistically significant with the expected negative sign, as is public 
investment (Table 3).  This result holds when we re-estimate (5) without the statistically 
insignificant quality of bureaucracy variable and under various alternative specifications.  This 
result appears to suggest that crowding-out appears to be present among the sample countries 
during the observed periods.  Curiously, corruption by itself is statistically insignificant, thus 
suggesting that corruption does not directly influence private investment, but through its impact 
on public investment.  This result compliments the cross-sectional results of Dreher and Herzfeld 
(2005) who also fail to detect a statistically significant direct effect for corruption, although for 
aggregate investment only. 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 We employ different alternatives of conditioning variables to examine whether this result is robust and conclude 
that we fail to reject the null hypothesis with the given set of countries, time periods, and explanatory variables.  We 
also fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity for corruption, the interactive term, and the conditioning 
variables, to include Current Account Balance as a percentage of GDP, Broad Money as a percentage of GDP, and 
External Trade as a percentage of GDP.   
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 What is the impact of corruption on public investment?  Turning to the question of the 
impact of corruption on public investment, we employ the same methodology as with respect to 
the question of the impact of corruption on private investment.  Following the theoretical model, 
we allow corruption to directly influence the accumulation of public capital and indirectly 
through its influence on the quality of the bureaucracy and the accumulation of private 
investment.  Using the same variable notation as in (5), the base estimation equation for the 
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Again, we note the presence of serial correlation in the error terms when the base estimation 
equation is estimated in levels and thus specify the equation in first differences.16  
 Testing again for the presence of endogeneity of private investment in (5)17, we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity for private investment with respect to the public 
investment.18  When investigating whether the random effects GLS estimator is more appropriate 
than the fixed effects Within estimator, we again reject the null hypothesis that the regressors and 
effects are uncorrelated and thus employ the fixed effects estimator.  Lastly, when we examine 
whether the fixed effects are jointly significant, we find the time-specific effects to be 
statistically significant and thus employ the one-way time-specific fixed effects error 
components estimator. 
 From this paper’s perspective, the most important result is that the corruption is not 
statistically significant, whether its direct effect or its indirect effect through private investment 
                                                 
16 We reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at the 1% significance level using a Durbin-Watson test for 
serial correlation.  Respecifying the model in first differences, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation.   
17 We fail to reject with a Hausman test statistic of 2.07 with 678 degrees of freedom.  
18 We employ different alternatives of conditioning variables to examine whether this result is robust and conclude 
that we fail to reject the null hypothesis with the given set of countries, time periods, and explanatory variables.  We 
also fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity for corruption, the interactive term, and the conditioning 
variables, to include Current Account Balance as a percentage of GDP, Broad Money as a percentage of GDP, and 
External Trade as a percentage of GDP.   
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(Table 4).  This result is striking and contrary to the results of the majority of the previous 
literature, with the previously noted exception of Dreher and Herzfeld (2005).  This result holds 
when we re-estimate (6) without the statistically insignificant quality of bureaucracy variable and 
under various alternative specifications.  The estimated coefficient for the quality of the 
bureaucracy is quite fragile with respect to the inclusion of the time-specific effects, suggesting 
that previous results may merely be capturing a proxy effect.  The crowding out effect noted in 
the estimation of (5) appears again, suggesting that crowding out does occur in the sample 
countries and time periods. 
 We must caution, however, that another explanation exists for the lack of significance of 
the quality of bureaucracy and corruption variables.  We are estimating with panel data in first 
differences, not in levels or cross-section as with previous analyses in the literature.  Another 
explanation of the lack of significance is also related to our estimating panel data in differences.  
When estimating in differences we are attempting to determine if the changes in bureaucratic 
quality and corruption induce changes in the level of investment. We are not smoothing the data 
as is often the case with cross-section analysis; we are attempting to capture unobserved time and 
country-specific effects. We do consider the insignificance of the estimated coefficients, given 
our a priori hypotheses, somewhat disappointing and consider it an area in need of future 
research, perhaps with other proxies. 
What is the impact of corruption on human capital?  Measuring the potential impact of 
corruption on the accumulation of human capital is, understandably, a difficult task.  As with 
measuring corruption, we must employ imperfect proxies for human capital.  Given our desire to 
investigate the influence corruption across countries and time, school-based measures of human 
capital are unavailable to us.19   We, however, can employ an outcome based measures of human 
                                                 
19 A number of authors have used education as a proxy for human capital in growth regressions, and we investigated 
this route for our research as well. However, education data for such a broad panel of emerging market economies is 
not available. However, we merged the education dataset from Lee and Barro (2001) with our panel for the 
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capital accumulation, infant mortality per 1,000 live births, to investigate the relationship 
between corruption and the accumulation of human capital.  Our estimating equation for the 
change in human capital, H, is: 
ittiititititit ZQyCH νλµββββ ++++++= 4321  (7)
where y is the change in per capita GDP.  We add public health expenditures as a percentage of 
GDP as a conditioning variable for these regressions.  Again, we note the presence of serial 
correlation in the error terms when the base estimation equation is estimated in levels and thus 
specify the equation in first differences.20  Testing for the presence of endogeneity of corruption 
in (7)21, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity.22  When investigating whether the 
random effects GLS estimator is more appropriate than the fixed effects Within estimator, we 
again reject the null hypothesis that the regressors and effects are uncorrelated and thus employ 
the fixed effects estimator.   
 From this paper’s perspective, the most important result is the fragility of the corruption 
variable to different specifications.  In the most parsimonious specification, without public health 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP, corruption is positive and statistically significant.  
Including public expenditures as a percentage of GDP does reduce the number of observations 
significantly and the estimated coefficient on corruption is insignificant.  Finally, re-specifying 
the equation to investigate whether corruption directly and indirectly influences the accumulation 
of human capital, we find that direct effect of corruption is 1/3 that of the parsimonious equation 
                                                                                                                                                             
overlapping years and countries to investigate whether infant mortality and education were related. Using data for 35 
of our countries for the years 1985, 1990, and 1995, we find a correlation of .71 between the two series, leading us 
to conclude that much of the informational content in an education proxy is also contained in our primary proxy for 
human capital, infant mortality.  
20 We reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at the 1% significance level using a Durbin-Watson test for 
serial correlation.  Re-specifying the model in first differences, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation.   
21 We fail to reject with a test statistic of 0.2127 with 652 degrees of freedom.  
22 We employ different alternatives of conditioning variables to examine whether this result is robust and conclude 
that we fail to reject the null hypothesis with the given set of countries, time periods, and explanatory variables.  We 
also fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity for public health expenditures as percentage of GDP.  
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and that the indirect effect through public investment is positive and significant.  The message is 
clear, however, corruption does have a human cost.  These results echo those of Mo (2001) who 
notes that corruption lowers average schooling (a viable proxy in cross-sectional samples) by 
0.25 years.  Dreher and Herzfeld (2005) also note that an increase in the corruption index by one 
point appears to lower school enrollment and life expectancy by five percentage points and 2.5 
years, respectively. 
 What is the impact of corruption on governance? While recent empirical evidence 
suggests that governance positively and significantly influences economic growth, the evidence 
is far from conclusive.  A priori, one would expect the relationship to exhibit to be negative.  As 
with our previous estimations, we hypothesize that there exists a series of direct and indirect 
effects of corruption on governance.  We estimate the following equation: 
ittiitit
G
itititit ZyICCQ νλµββββ ++++++= 4321 *  (8)
 Again, we note the presence of serial correlation in the error terms when the base 
estimation equation is estimated in levels and thus specify the equation in first differences.23  
Testing for the presence of endogeneity of corruption in (8)24, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity.25  When investigating whether the random effects GLS estimator is 
more appropriate than the fixed effects Within estimator, we again reject the null hypothesis that 
the regressors and effects are uncorrelated and thus employ the fixed effects estimator.   
 Not surprisingly, both corruption’s direct effect and the interaction term between 
corruption and public investment prove significant and have the expected negative sign. The 
explanatory power of this equation is among the highest of any we report in this note. Further, 
                                                 
23 We reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at the 1% significance level using a Durbin-Watson test for 
serial correlation.  Re-specifying the model in first differences, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation.   
24 We fail to reject with a test statistic of 04875 with 684 degrees of freedom.  
25 We employ different alternatives of conditioning variables to examine whether this result is robust and conclude 
that we fail to reject the null hypothesis with the given set of countries, time periods, and explanatory variables.   
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this relationship is robust to the inclusion of various conditioning variables in the Z matrix. 
Hence we conclude that increases in corruption are associated with declines in the quality of the 
bureaucracy. 
What is the impact of corruption on economic growth?  We turn now to the question of 
whether corruption significantly influences economic growth. As suggested by equation (4) of 
the theoretical model, GDP growth is a function of human and physical capital, and 
macroeconomic conditions, as the literature suggests, but also corruption and governance. Thus, 





ititit ZHQIICy νλµββββββ ++++++++= 554321  (9)
 Again, we note the presence of serial correlation in the error terms when the base 
estimation equation is estimated in levels and thus specify the equation in first differences.26  
Testing for the presence of endogeneity of corruption in (8)27, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity.28  When investigating whether the random effects GLS estimator is 
more appropriate than the fixed effects Within estimator, we again reject the null hypothesis that 
the regressors and effects are uncorrelated and thus employ the fixed effects estimator.   
 Curiously, corruption appears to be insignificant with respect to growth in GDP per 
capita, regardless of the estimated used to investigate this hypothesis.  This result compliments 
the cross-sectional findings of Dreher and Herzfeld (2005) and Pellegrini and Gerlaugh (2004) 
who also fail to detect a statistically significant direct effect of corruption on economic growth.  
We investigated alternative specifications, to include interacting corruption with the stocks of 
private and public investment, yet these variables are also insignificant.  We must caution that 
                                                 
26 We reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at the 1% significance level using a Durbin-Watson test for 
serial correlation.  Re-specifying the model in first differences, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation.   
27 We fail to reject with a test statistic of 1.541 with 680 degrees of freedom for the OLS model. 
28 We employ different alternatives of conditioning variables to examine whether this result is robust and conclude 
that we fail to reject the null hypothesis with the given set of countries, time periods, and explanatory variables.   
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we are examining whether the change in corruption influences the rate of growth in GDP; a 
much more difficult association to detect than that previously examined in the literature, that is, 
whether levels of GDP per capita are associated with levels of corruption.  Thus, our a priori 
hypothesis that corruption appears to directly influence economic growth is not supported by the 
empirical evidence at this point in time. 
 In contrast, the expected positive impact of quality of the bureaucracy is statistically 
significant.  The coefficient is quite large, implying that a 1% change in governance (as proxied 
by quality of the bureaucracy), elicits a 3.6% change in the GDP growth rate.  This finding is 
consistent with the literature and suggests that corruption may indirect influence economic 
growth through its negative influence on governance.  Also consistent with the literature is 
private investment’s positive impact on economic growth which is positive and statistically 
significant.  Curiously, public investment and human capital (as proxied by infant mortality) fail 
to test significant in any of the models we report.  The finding on human capital is somewhat 
surprising and contrasts with a number of works found in the literature. Our finding on public 
capital is consistent with the country-specific literature that breaks down public investment by 
type.  We must again caution that our findings are limited to our sample countries and time 
periods but suggest that these findings warrant further investigation. 
 In summary, private investment appears to be important for growth, as does governance. 
Public and human capital flows do not appear to influence growth, though we must caution that 
our measure of human capital leaves much to be desired.  Corruption’s impact on public and 
private investment is not as unambiguous as previous cross-section and country-specific time 
series studies suggest.  We find that, for our sample countries, corruption does not appear to 
directly influence economic growth but does so indirectly via its interaction with public 
investment and governance quality.  We recognize that much work needs to be done in this area, 
however, and merely suggest a proper accounting of corruption’s influence may need to more 
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robustly examine the indirect rather than the direct linkages between corruption and economic 
growth. 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 In this paper a number of noteworthy issues have been explored.  Some of our 
conclusions  run counter to the conventional wisdom and evidence provided in the literature.  
Much of the previous work in corruption and investment has been constrained by empirical 
limitations more stringent than ours, and often the motivations seem ad hoc. In addition, previous 
works tend to rely on cross-sectional or country-specific time series, utilizing investment datasets 
that do not necessarily reflect reality.  Our results, however, do appear to support the more recent 
findings (although reliant on cross-sectional data) that corruption does not directly influence 
economic growth. 
 Among the more interesting empirical findings is that there exists an interaction effect 
associated with public investment that dampens private investment.  Corruption’s impact on 
public investment manifests itself in such a way as to repel private investment in the presence of 
corruption.  Private investors have objective functions which are generally different than those of 
persons charged with allocating public investment.  Return on investment is very often not the 
primary concern of those involved with public investment.  On the other hand, private investors 
demand a return and will direct their investments where they anticipate the highest return with 
the least variance.  Undoubtedly corruption adds uncertainty to the returns.  Couple this notion 
with the fact that numerous authors have shown private investment to be more important than 
public investment for economic growth, and the path to a virtuous circle becomes clear. 
 The impact of reduced corruption on public investment is less clear.  The proxies we 
employ for physical public investment are less than satisfactory. Measuring the quality of other 
types of public investment such as military bases and education has proven difficult. However, if 
we consider the estimation we have already performed using infant mortality as proxy for human 
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capital, and instead view infant mortality rates as measuring the quality of healthcare 
infrastructure, then we already have our answer: reduced corruption is associated with lower 
infant mortality rates. If one accepts the notion that infant mortality rates can serve as a valid 
proxy for the quality of healthcare infrastructure, then the returns to public investment from 




Country Period Country Period 
    
Argentina 1984-1999 Azerbaijan 1998-1999 
Bangladesh 1984-1999 Bolivia 1987-1999 
Brazil 1984-1998 Bulgaria 1990-1999 
Chile 1984-1999 China 1984-1999 
Colombia 1984-1999 Costa Rica 1984-1998 
Cote d'Ivoire 1986-1999 Dominican Rep. 1984-1999 
Ecuador 1984-1999 Egypt 1984-1999 
El Salvador 1984-1999 Estonia 1998-1999 
Guatemala 1984-1999 Guinea-Bissau 1987-1999 
Guyana 1987-1999 Haiti 1984-1999 
India 1984-1999 Indonesia 1984-1999 
Iran 1984-1999 Kazakhstan 1998-1999 
Kenya 1985-1999 Korea Republic 1984-1999 
Lithuania 1998-1999 Madagascar 1984-1999 
Malawi 1984-1999 Malaysia 1984-1999 
Mexico 1984-1999 Morocco 1984-1999 
Namibia 1990-1999 Nicaragua 1990-1999 
Pakistan 1984-1999 Panama 1985-1999 
Papua New Guinea 1984-1998 Paraguay 1984-1999 
Peru 1984-1999 Philippines 1984-1999 
Poland 1989-1999 Romania 1991-1999 
South Africa 1984-1999 Thailand 1984-1999 
Trinidad & Tobago 1984-1999 Tunisia 1984-1999 
Turkey 1984-1999 Uruguay 1984-1999 






 Description and Source 
Bureaucratic Quality Quality of the bureaucracy: re-scaled from 0 = Inept to 6 = Totally 
Competent to 0 = Inept to 1 = Totally Competent 
Source: International Country Risk Guide 
Corruption Corruption index: re-scaled from 0 = Inept to 6 = Totally Competent 
to 0 = Inept to 1 = Totally Competent 
Source: International Country Risk Guide 
Private Investment Public investment to Gross Domestic Product 
Source: Author created 
Public Investment Private investment to Gross Domestic Product 
Source: Author created 
GDP Per Capita Gross Domestic Product per Capita 
Source: World Development Indicators 2002 
Current Account Current Account Balance as a percentage of GDP 
Source: World Development Indicators 2002 
Aid International aid as a percentage of central government expenditures 
Source: World Development Indicators 2002 
External Debt External debt as a percentage of GDP 
Source: Global Development Finance 2002 
Trade Exports + Imports as a percentage of GDP 
Source: World Development Indicators 2002 
Infant Mortality Deaths per 1,000 live births 
Source: International Database, U.S. Census 2002 
Population Total population 
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Not for Publication Theoretical Appendix 
We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function for the economy such that production at 
time t is given by θϕβα tttttt LHGKAY =  where α, β, φ, θ > 0 and α + β + ϕ + θ = 1.  Yt is output, 
Kt, Ht, and Gt are  private, human, and public capital, and Lt is labor at time t.  Labor is assumed 
to grow exogenously at rate n.    We augment the standard term for exogenous technical 
progress, At to include exogenous technical progress, Tt, the level of governance, GOVt, and a 
matrix of exogenous variables that may influence output, Zt. We assume T grows exogenously at 
rate w.  
We assume governance to be a function of the level of corruption, Ct, and the quality of 
the bureaucracy, QB. We define At and GOVt as tttt ZGOVTA ⋅⋅= and GOVt = f(QB, Ct). 
Assuming that private investment, public investment, human capital formation, and labor force 
participation is a function of corruption and a broad array of other variables, Z, leads to the 
following: ),( Ktt ZChK = , ),( Gtt ZCiG = , ),( Htt ZCjH = , ),( Ltt ZCkL = . 
 We assume that physical and human capital inputs in the aggregate production function 
are subject to decreasing returns to scale, thereby implying that the economy will tend toward 
constant private capital-labor, public capital-labor, and human capital-labor ratios in the long-
run.  Following Mankiw et al. (1992), we define ik , ig, and ih to be the fractions of output 
invested in private, public, and human capital, respectively, then kt = (Kt / At Lt ), gt = (Gt / At Lt ), 
and ht = (Ht / At Lt ), are the stocks of private, public, and human capital per effective unit of 
labor.  We assume further that the same production function applies to all forms of reproducible 
capital and consumption, so that one unit of capital can be transformed into one unit of 
consumption without cost, and vice versa.  Recalling that labor and technology grow 
exogenously at rates n and w, and assuming that all capital depreciates at a uniform rate δ, we 
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now define c to be a measure of the rate of change in Ct, the level of corruption. The growth of 
output is dictated over time by 
ttkt kcwnyik )( +++−= δ&  [16] 
ttgt gcwnyig )( +++−= δ&   
ttht hcwnyih )( +++−= δ& .  
 
Assuming decreasing marginal returns to all forms of reproducible capital and that no 
combination of capital inputs exhibits constant marginal returns, the evolution of private-capital 
stock per effective worker over time is given by 
ttkt kcwnyik )( +++−= δ&  [17]
ttttkt kcwnhgkik )( +++−= δϕβα& .  
 
In steady-state, the change in the rate of accumulation of private-capital stock per effective 
worker is zero, i.e., 0=tk& , so we restate equation (17) as 
**** )( kcwnhgkik +++= δϕβα , [18]
 
where k*, g* , and h* are the steady-state stocks of private, public, and human capital stock per 





















ki +++= δϕβα , [19]
 
**** )( ttkhtkgtk kcwnkiikiiki +++=−− δϕϕϕβββα  [20]
or,  **1 )( tthgk kcwnkiii +++=++−− δϕβαϕβϕβ   
 
















k hgkt   . 
[21]
 
Following the same algebraic process we can solve for the steady-state levels of public and 
































h gkht   . 
[23]
  
 The key insights provided by equations (21), (22), and (23) are that corruption lowers the 
steady-state levels of all three types of capital, i.e., as c increases, k*, g*, and h*, are each lower 
than with no corruption present. 
We now turn to the task of solving for the steady-state level of output per effective unit of 
labor. If we substitute equations (21), (22), and (23) into (1), and note that  































y gkhhkghgkt   . 
[24]
 
Reorganizing equation (24) yields 
( ) ( ) ( ) ϕβα ϕϕβα βϕβα αϕβα ϕβαδ −−−−−−−−−−−−
++
+++=
1111* )1( hgkt iiicwn
y    . 
[25]
 
Equation (25) makes the potential impact of corruption readily apparent, any reduction in c also 
improves the steady state level of output per effective unit of labor and vice-versa. This result 
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suggests that actions to lower Ct (negative c) results in a higher level of steady state output per 
effective unit of labor. 
 Let 
^
y  be actual output per effective worker at time t, then approximating about the 








ty λ  
[26]
  
where  λ = (n + w + δ + c)(1 - α - β - ϕ).   






tyeyety λτλτ −− +−=  [27]
where )( 1
^










tytyeyetyty −+−=− −− λτλτ  
))(ln*)(ln1( 1
^
tyye −−= −λτ  
[28]
 
Since we cannot observe steady state output in equation (28), we substitute for y* using equation 
(25) to get output per effective unit of labor: 



































    
[29]
 






































    
[30]
 
Note, however, that equation (30) this is expressed in output per effective unit of labor and 
Mankiw et al. (1992) and Islam (1995) use output per capita. We can, therefore, re-express this 
equation by noting that output per effective unit of labor is )()(/)()(
^











where ln y(t) is the log of output per capita and A(t) is defined as before. 
 Substituting )(
^

















































































































This is a useful result: we have an equation where the difference in per capita output is a 
function of the difference in A.  We have stated per capita output in terms of the change of A(t) 
and other factors.  Following Islam (1995), we note that if A(t1) represents the initial conditions, 
then A(t1) is unobserved and e-λτ A(t1) is the unobserved country-specific effect. To see this, note 
that we do not observe T(0), GOV(0), or Z(0). 
 We thus have a model for the change in per capita output that illustrates the role of 



















































    
[35]
 
Note that the term with the double underline is our unobservable initial conditions. 
